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On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs H.K. and J.C., minor 
children, by and through their father and legal guardian Clinton Farwell (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), 
bring this Class Action Complaint against Google LLC (“Google”) for violation of Illinois’ 
Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 ILCS 14/1, et seq., and violation of California’s 
Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200, predicated on violation of the 
federal Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 501, et seq., and allege 
as follows based on personal knowledge as to themselves, on the investigation of their counsel and 
the advice and consultation of certain third-party agents as to technical matters, and on information 
and belief as to other matters, and demand trial by jury. 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
1. Plaintiffs bring this action for damages and other legal and equitable remedies 
resulting from the illegal actions of Google in collecting, storing, and using their and other 
similarly situated childrens’ biometric identifiers1 and biometric information2 (referred to 
collectively as “biometrics”), as well as numerous other forms of personally identifying 
information, without them requisite consent of their legal guardians – in direct violation of both 
BIPA and COPPA. 
2. In 1999, to better protect the privacy of children under the age of 13, the United 
States Congress enacted COPPA in response to a growing concern over the collection of children’s 
data on the Internet.  In passing COPPA, Congress specifically sought to increase parental 
involvement in children’s online activities, ensure children’s safety during their participation in 
online activities, and most importantly, protect children’s personal information. Ultimately, 
Congress enacted COPPA with the specific goal of placing parents in control over what 
information is collected from their young children online.  To that end, COPPA requires, in 
relevant part, that websites and online services fully and clearly disclose their data collection, use, 
and disclosure practices, and obtain “verifiable parental consent” before collecting, using, or 
 
1  A “biometric identifier” is any personal feature that is unique to an individual, including 
fingerprints, iris scans, DNA and “face geometry,” among others. 
  
2  “Biometric information” is any information captured, converted, stored, or shared based on 
a person’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual. 
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disclosing personal information from children under 13.  Further, COPPA requires websites and 
online services to permit parents to review all personal information they collect and maintain from 
children under 13, and to allow parents to refuse further use or maintenance of those data. 
Similarly, websites and online services may not condition a child’s use of a site or service on the 
collection of more personal information than is reasonably necessary, and must take reasonable 
steps to keep confidential and safe any personal information in their possession. 
3. More recently, in 2008, the Illinois Legislature recognized the importance of 
protecting the privacy of individuals’ biometric data, finding that “[b]iometrics are unlike other 
unique identifiers that are used to access finances or other sensitive information.”  740 ILCS 
14/5(c).  “For example, social security numbers, when compromised, can be changed.  Biometrics, 
however, are biologically unique to the individual; therefore, once compromised, the individual has 
no recourse, is at heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to withdraw from biometric-
facilitated transactions.”  Id. 
4. In recognition of these concerns over the security of individuals’ biometrics, the 
Illinois Legislature enacted BIPA, which provides, inter alia, that a private entity like Google may 
not obtain and/or possess an individual’s biometrics unless it: (1) informs that person in writing 
that biometric identifiers or information will be collected or stored, see id.; (2) informs that person 
in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which such biometric identifiers or 
biometric information is being collected, stored, and used, see id.; (3) receives a written release 
from the person for the collection of her biometric identifiers or information, see id.; and (4) 
publishes publicly available written retention schedules and guidelines for permanently destroying 
biometric identifiers and biometric information, 740 ILCS 14/15(a). 
5. Incredibly, Google has managed to violate both of these important consumer 
protection statutes (COPPA and BIPA) at the same time, by collecting, storing, and using the 
personally identifying biometric data of millions of school children throughout the country 
(including thousands in Illinois), most of whom are under the age of 13, without seeking, much less 
obtaining the requisite informed written consent from any of their parents or other legal guardians. 
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6. Google has infiltrated the primary and secondary school system in this country by 
providing access to its “ChromeBook” laptops, which come pre-installed with its “G Suite for 
Education” platform (formerly referred to as Google Apps for Education), to over half of the 
nation’s school children, including those in Illinois, most of whom are under the age of 13.  When 
these children use Google’s “G Suite for Education” platform on the company’s ChromeBook 
laptops at school, Google creates, collects, stores and uses their “face templates” (or “scans of face 
geometry”) and “voiceprints” – highly sensitive and immutable biometric data – as well as various 
other forms of personally identifying information pertaining to these children, including: 
a. their physical locations; 
b. the websites they visit; 
c. every search term they use in Google’s search engine (and the results they 
click on); 
d. the videos they watch on YouTube; 
e. personal contact lists; 
f. voice recordings; 
g. saved passwords; and 
h. other behavioral information 
7. Each voiceprint and face template that Google extracts from a child and catalogues 
in its vast biometrics database is unique to that child, in the same way that a fingerprint uniquely 
identifies one and only one person. Google supplements this biometric data with other personally 
identifying information pertaining to each child, including the child’s e-mail address and name. 
8. Thus, in direct violation of both BIPA and COPPA, Google has collected, stored, 
and used (and continues to collect, store, and use) – without providing notice, obtaining informed 
or verifiable parental consent, or publishing data retention policies – the biometrics and other 
personally identifying information of millions of school children under the age of 13 across the 
country, including tens of thousands of young children in Illinois. 
9. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated children, by and 
through their father and legal guardian Clinton Farwell, bring this action to stop Google from 
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further violating the BIPA-protected privacy rights of children in Illinois and the COPPA-protected 
privacy rights of children under 13 all across the country in connection with their use of the “G 
Suite for Education” platform, and to recover statutory damages for Google’s unauthorized 
collection, storage, and use of Illinois students’ biometric data in violation of BIPA. 
PARTIES 
10. Plaintiffs H.K. and J.C., and their father and natural legal guardian, Clinton Farwell 
are, and at all relevant times have been, citizens of the State of Illinois residing in Bushnell, 
Illinois.  Plaintiffs H.K. and J.C. were under the age of 13 when they used Google’s “G Suite for 
Education” platform at their elementary school in Bushnell, Illinois, which is within Prairie City 
Community Unit School District #170, and they are still under the age of 13 today.  Neither 
Plaintiff H.K. nor Plaintiff J.C. was asked for verifiable or written parental consent authorizing 
Google extraction, collection, storage, and use of their personally and uniquely identifying 
“biometric identifiers” or “biometric information,” nor was Plaintiffs’ father, Clinton Farwell, 
notified of or asked to provide his written authorization to permit Google’s collection, storage, or 
use of such data. 
11. Google, LLC is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters at 1600 Amphitheatre 
Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043.  Google is also registered to do business in Illinois 
(No. 65161605). 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
12. The Court has original subject-matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the 
Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (“CAFA”), because: (i) the proposed BIPA Class 
consists of at least tens of thousands of members; (ii) at least one member of the proposed BIPA 
Class, including both of the Plaintiffs as well as their father, is a citizen of a state different from 
Google; and (iii) the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.00, exclusive of interests 
and costs.  Google has extracted, collected, stored, and used thousands of minor school childrens’ 
voiceprints and scans of face geometry in connection with their use of Google’s “G Suite for 
Education” platform on the company’s “ChromeBook” laptops at primary and secondary schools in 
Illinois.  The estimated number of children who have been impacted by Google’s conduct in 
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Illinois multiplied by the BIPA’s statutory liquidated damages figure ($5,000.00 for each 
intentional or reckless violation and $1,000.00 for each negligent violation) easily exceeds CAFA’s 
$5,000,000.00 threshold.  The Court also has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ UCL claim 
for injunctive relief arising from Google’s violations of COPPA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
13. Personal jurisdiction and venue are proper in California and within this District 
because Defendant maintains its corporate headquarters and principal place of business within this 
District, in Mountain View, California. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
I. Biometric Technology Implicates Consumer Privacy Concerns 
14. “Biometrics” refers to unique physical characteristics used to identify an individual.  
One of the most prevalent uses of biometrics is in facial recognition technology, which works by 
scanning a human face or an image thereof, extracting facial feature data based on specific 
“biometric identifiers” (i.e., details about the face’s geometry as determined by facial points and 
contours), and comparing the resulting “face template” (or “faceprint”) against the face templates 
stored in a “face template database.”  If a database match is found, an individual can be identified. 
15. The use of facial recognition technology in the commercial context presents 
numerous consumer privacy concerns.  During a 2012 hearing before the United States Senate 
Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law, a member of the U.S. Senate stated that 
“there is nothing inherently right or wrong with [facial recognition technology, but] if we do not 
stop and carefully consider the way we use [it], it may also be abused in ways that could threaten 
basic aspects of our privacy and civil liberties.”3  Senator Franken noted, for example, that facial 
recognition technology could be “abused to not only identify protesters at political events and 
rallies, but to target them for selective jailing and prosecution.”4 
 
3  What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Tech. & the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 
(2012), available at https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/jenniferlynch_eff-senate-testimony-
face_recognition.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2020). 
 
4  Id. 
Case 5:20-cv-02257   Document 1   Filed 04/02/20   Page 6 of 32
 






























16. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has raised similar concerns, and recently 
released a “Best Practices” guide for companies using facial recognition technology.5  In the guide, 
the Commission underscores the importance of companies’ obtaining affirmative consent from 
consumers before extracting and collecting their biometric identifiers and biometric information 
from digital photographs. 
II. The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act 
17. In 2008, Illinois enacted the BIPA due to the “very serious need [for] protections for 
the citizens of Illinois when it [comes to their] biometric information.”  Illinois House Transcript, 
2008 Reg. Sess. No. 276.  The BIPA makes it unlawful for a company to, inter alia, “collect, 
capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person’s or a customer’s biometric 
identifiers6 or biometric information, unless it first: 
 
(l) informs the subject . . . in writing that a biometric identifier or 
biometric information is being collected or stored; 
 
(2) informs the subject . . . in writing of the specific purpose and 
length of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric 
information is being collected, stored, and used; and 
 
(3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric 
identifier or biometric information or the subject’s legally authorized 
representative.” 
740 ILCS 14/15 (b). 
18. Section 15(a) of the BIPA also provides: 
 
A private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric 
information must develop a written policy, made available to the 
public, establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for 
permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric 
information when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such 
identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the 
individual’s last interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs 
first. 
740 ILCS 14/15(a). 
 
5  Facing Facts: Best Practices for Common Uses of Facial Recognition Technologies, 
Federal Trade Commission (Oct. 2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/facing-facts-best-practices-common-uses-
facial-recognition-technologies/121022facialtechrpt.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2020). 
6  BIPA’s definition of “biometric identifier” expressly includes information collected about 
the geometry of the face (i.e., facial data obtained through facial recognition technology).  See 740 
ILCS 14/10. 
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19. As alleged below, Google’s practices of collecting, storing, and using biometric 
identifiers and information from school children in Illinois without the requisite informed written 
consent violate all three prongs of § 15(b) of the BIPA.  Google’s failure to provide a publicly 
available written policy regarding its schedule and guidelines for the retention and permanent 
destruction of these childrens’ biometrics also violates § 15(a) of the BIPA. 
III. The Federal Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
20. In 1999, recognizing the vulnerability of children in the Internet age, Congress 
enacted the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506.  
COPPA’s express goal is to protect children’s privacy while they are connected to the internet.  
Under COPPA, developers of child-focused applications like Google’s “G Suite for Education” 
service cannot lawfully obtain the personally identifiable information of children under 13 years of 
age without first obtaining verifiable consent from their parents. 
21. COPPA applies to any operator of a commercial website or online service 
(including an app) that is directed to children and that: (a) collects, uses, and/or discloses 
personally identifiable information from children, or (b) on whose behalf such information is 
collected or maintained.  Under COPPA, personally identifiable information is “collected or 
maintained on behalf of an operator when…[t]he operator benefits by allowing another person to 
collect personally identifiable information directly from users of” an online service. 16 C.F.R. § 
312.2.  In addition, COPPA applies to any operator of a commercial website or online service that 
has actual knowledge that it collects, uses, and/or discloses personally identifiable information 
from children. 
22. Under COPPA, “personally identifiable information” includes information like 
names, email addresses, and social security numbers. COPPA’s broad definition of “personally 
identifiable information” is as follows: 
 
“individually identifiable information about an individual collected 
online,” which includes (1) a first and last name; (2) a physical 
address including street name and name of a city or town; (3) online 
contact information (separately defined as “an email address or any 
other substantially similar identifier that permits direct contact with a 
person online”); (4) a screen name or user name; (5) telephone 
number; (6) social security number; (7) a media file containing a 
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child’s image or voice; (8) geolocation information sufficient to 
identify street name and name of a city or town; (9) a “persistent 
identifier that can be used to recognize a user over time and across 
different Web sites or online services” (including but not limited to 
“a customer number held in a cookie, an Internet Protocol (IP) 
address, a processor or device serial number, or unique device 
identifier”); and (10) any information concerning the child or the 
child’s parents that the operator collects then combines with an 
identifier. 
23. The FTC regards “persistent identifiers” as “personally identifiable” information 
that can be reasonably linked to a particular child. The FTC amended COPPA’s definition of 
“personally identifiable information” to clarify the inclusion of persistent identifiers.7 
24. In order to lawfully collect, use, or disclose personally identifiable information, 
COPPA requires that an operator meet specific requirements, including each of the following: 
a. Posting a privacy policy on its website or online service providing clear, 
understandable, and complete notice of its information practices, including 
what information the website operator collects from children online, how it 
uses such information, its disclosure practices for such information, and 
other specific disclosures as set forth in the Rule; 
b. Providing clear, understandable, and complete notice of its information 
practices, including specific disclosures, directly to parents; and 
c. Obtaining verifiable parental consent prior to collecting, using, and/or 
disclosing personally identifiable information from children. 
25. Under COPPA, “[o]btaining verifiable consent means making any reasonable effort 
(taking into consideration available technology) to ensure that before personally identifiable 
information is collected from a child, a parent of the child. . . [r]eceives notice of the operator’s 
personally identifiable information collection, use, and disclosure practices; and [a]uthorizes any 
collection, use, and/or disclosure of the personally identifiable information.” 16 C.F.R. § 312.2. 
 
 
7  See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2016/04/keeping-
onlineadvertising-industry (2016 FTC Blog post from Director of the FTC Bureau of Consumer 
Protection) (last visited November 22, 2019). 
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26. The FTC recently clarified acceptable methods for obtaining verifiable parental 
consent, which include: 
a. providing a consent form for parents to sign and return; 
b. requiring the use of a credit card/online payment that provides notification of 
each transaction; 
c. connecting to trained personnel via video conference; 
d. calling a staffed toll-free number; 
e. emailing the parent soliciting a response email plus requesting follow-up 
information from the parent; 
f. asking knowledge-based questions; or 
g. verifying a photo ID from the parent compared to a second photo using 
facial recognition technology.8 
27. As alleged below, Google’s practices of collecting, storing and using biometric 
identifiers, biometric information, and other personally identifying information from school 
children under 13, without the requisite verifiable parental consent, are in clear violation of 
COPPA. 
IV. Google Violates Both the Illinois BIPA and the Federal COPPA 
28. In 2011, Google’s then-CEO Eric Schmidt discussed the company’s past 
development of facial recognition technology, and explained that he had put the brakes on the 
program due to the profound implications he believed the technology would have on individuals’ 
privacy rights.  Characterizing facial recognition technology as “crossing the creepy line,” Mr. 
Schmidt said at the time “that [Google] would not build a database capable of recognizing 
individual faces even though it is increasingly possible.”  Matt Warman, Google Warns Against 




rule-six-step-compliance (last visited November 22, 2019). 
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technology.html.  Nonetheless, Mr. Schmidt predicted that “some company by the way is going to 
cross that line.”  Id. 
29. In 2013, Mr. Schmidt wrote a piece for The Wall Street Journal, titled “The Dark 
Side of the Digital Revolution,” in which he again cautioned against the collection of Americans’ 
biometric data and advocated in favor of regulating the collection and use of such data in this 
country, writing in pertinent part: 
 
Today’s facial-recognition systems use a camera to zoom in on an 
individual’s eyes, mouth and nose, and extract a “feature vector,” a 
set of numbers that describes key aspects of the image, such as the 
precise distance between the eyes. (Remember, in the end, digital 
images are just numbers.)  Those numbers can be fed back into a 
large database of faces in search of a match.  The accuracy of this 
software is limited today (by, among other things, pictures shot in 
profile), but the progress in this field is remarkable.  A team at 
Carnegie Mellon demonstrated in a 2011 study that the combination 
of “off-the-shelf” facial recognition software and publicly available 
online data (such as social network profiles) can match a large 
number of faces very quickly.  With cloud computing, it takes just 
seconds to compare millions of faces.  The accuracy improves with 
people who have many pictures of themselves available online—
which, in the age of Facebook, is practically everyone.  
 
By indexing our biometric signatures, some governments will try to 
track our every move and word, both physically and digitally.  That’s 
why we need to fight hard not just for our own privacy and security, 
but also for those who are not equipped to do so themselves.  We can 
regulate biometric data at home in democratic countries, which helps.  
Eric Schmidt, The Dark Side of the Digital Revolution, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Apr. 19, 2013, 
available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873240307 04578424650479285218. 
30. Ironically, the company that Google’s CEO predicted in 2011 would one day “cross 
that line” by diving into the consumer biometrics-collection business turned out to be none other 
than Google itself. 
31. In May 2015, Google announced the release of its web- and mobile app-based photo 
sharing and storage service called Google Photos.  Users of Google Photos immediately began 
uploading millions of photos per day through the service, and Google in turn began using its 
“FaceNet”-powered facial recognition technology to extract, collect, store, and catalog the 
biometric data of everyone whose faces appeared in all of those uploaded photographs, in real 
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time.9  Google has sold licenses to its Google Photos APIs, including APIs that enable the use of its 
facial recognition technology, to various mobile application developers, and derives substantial 
commercial profit from such sales.  Thus, less than four years after warning of the immense 
dangers posed by facial recognition technology, Google began using that very technology to collect 
the immutable biometric data of hundreds of millions of its users worldwide. 
32. But Google’s pursuit of the world’s biometric data didn’t end there.  Most recently, 
Google has unleashed its immensely powerful biometrics-collection technology on primary and 
secondary school children throughout the country, including across the state of Illinois. 
33. Specifically, Google provides its “ChromeBook” laptops to grade schools, 
elementary schools, and high schools nationwide, who in turn make these computing devices 
available for use by children who attend their schools.  The ChromeBooks that Google provides to 
schools come equipped with Google’s “G Suite for Education” platform, a cloud-based service 
used by young students under the age of 13 all across the country, including the state of Illinois. 
34. To drive adoption in more schools – and to alleviate legitimate concerns about its 
history of privacy abuses – Google publicly assured parents, students, and educators alike that the 
company takes student privacy seriously and that it only collects education-related data from 
students using its “G Suite for Education” platform. Google also publicly promised never to mine 
student data for its own commercial purposes.  In particular, Google has stated that it recognizes 
that “trust is earned through protecting teacher and student privacy” and has made a number of 
public promises designed to convince parents, teachers, school districts, and students that it will 
protect the privacy of students who use the “G Suite for Education” platform.10   
35. To reaffirm the commitments it has made over the years to safeguard and protect 
student privacy, including to school districts, Google signed the K-12 School Service Provider 
 
9  A research paper released by Google engineers at around the same time as the release of 
Google Photos describes FaceNet as “a unified system for face verification (is this the same 
person), recognition (who is this person) and clustering (find common people among these faces).” 
Schroff, Florian, et al., “FaceNet: A Unified Embedding for Face Recognition and Clustering,” 
June 7, 2015, available at https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7298682. 
 
10  Privacy and Security, Google LLC, http://services.google.com/th/files/misc/gsuite for_ 
education_ privacy_s ecurity.pdf (last visited March 26, 2020). 
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Pledge to Safeguard Student Privacy (the “Student Privacy Pledge”) in or around January 2015.  
The Student Privacy Pledge is a set of principles and promises developed by the Future of Privacy 
Forum and The Software & Information Industry Association regarding the collection, use, and 
maintenance of student data.11  Though not an original signatory, and hesitant to sign on (only 
succumbing after public outrage), Googled eventually signed the Student Privacy Pledge12 and 
affirmatively and expressly committed to: 
a. Not collect, maintain, use or share student personal information beyond that 
needed for authorized educational/school purposes, or as authorized by the 
parent/student; 
b. Not use or disclose student information collected through an 
educational/school service (whether personal information or otherwise) for 
behavioral targeting of advertisements to students; 
c. Not build a personal profile of a student other than for supporting authorized 
educational/school purposes or as authorized by the parent/student; 
d. Not knowingly retain student personal information beyond the time period 
required to support the authorized educational/school purposes, or as 
authorized by the parent/student; 
e. Collect, use, share, and retain student personal information only for purposes 
for which Google was authorized by the educational institution/agency, 
teacher, or the parent/student; and 
f. Disclose clearly in contracts or privacy policies, including in a manner easy 
for parents to understand, what types of student personal information Google 
collects, if any, and the purposes for which the information Google 
maintains is used or shared with third parties. 
 
11  Student Privacy Pledge Signatories, Future of Privacy Forum and The Software & 
Information Industry Association, https://studentprivacypledge.org/signatories/ (last visited March 
26, 2020). 
 
12  Google Changes Course, Signs Student Data Privacy Pledge, Wall Street Journal, 
https://blogs. wsj .com/digits/2015/01 /20/ google-changes-course-signs-student-data-pri 
vacypledge/ (last visited March 26, 2020). 
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36.  Although Google publicly promoted its decision to sign the Student Privacy Pledge, 
and received positive coverage in the press for having done so, Google quickly began breaking the 
commitments it had made in the Pledge. 
37. Specifically, since signing the Student Privacy Pledge, Google has implemented 
features on its “G Suite for Education” platform that instruct children to speak into the recording 
device on the ChromeBook laptops utilized at their schools (whereupon Google records the 
acoustic details and characteristics of their voices), and to look into the ChromeBook’s camera as 
well (whereupon Google scans and images the geometry of their faces, including the contours of 
their faces and the distances between certain localized facial points, such as the distances between 
the eyes and noses and ears). 
38. After Google has obtained the voice of a child using its “G Suite for Education” 
platform on one of its “ChromeBook” laptops, Google extracts, collects, stores, and catalogs the 
child’s “voiceprint”—a unique, immutable, and highly sensitive biometric identifier used to 
identify a person—in its vast database of personally identifying biometric data.  Likewise, after 
Google has scanned and imaged the face of a child using its “G Suite for Education” platform on 
one of its “ChromeBook” laptops, Google extracts, collects, stores, and catalogs the child’s “scan 
of face geometry” (also known as a “face template”)—another unique, immutable, and highly 
sensitive biometric identifier used to identify a person—in its vast database of personally 
identifying biometric data.  Accordingly, Google collects the “biometric identifiers” of children 
whose voices are recorded and whose faces are scanned while using its “G Suite for Education” 
platform in schools in Illinois and across the country, including of Plaintiffs and numerous other 
children under the age of 13.  See 740 ILCS 14/10. 
39. Google uses the voiceprints and face templates it collects to, inter alia, identify and 
track the children who use its ChromeBook laptops and the “G Suite for Education” platform that 
comes installed on them.  This technology works by comparing the voiceprints and face templates 
of children whose voices are recorded and faces are scanned while using a ChromeBook with the 
voiceprints and facial templates already saved in Google’s vast biometrics database.  Specifically, 
when a child’s face is scanned or voice is recorded using the “G Suite for Education” platform on a 
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ChromeBook laptop, Google’s sophisticated voice and facial recognition technology creates a 
voiceprint for the child’s voice or a or a face template for the child’s face, and then compares the 
generated voiceprint or face template against the voiceprints and face templates already stored in 
its database.  If there is a match, then Google is able to confirm the identity of the child using its 
platform, enhancing the functionality of the various features available on the platform and enabling 
Google to further improve the quality of the child’s voiceprint or face template stored in its 
database. 
40. The unique voiceprints and face templates that Google has collected from children 
in Illinois and across the country are not only used by Google to identify children by name, they 
are also used by Google to recognize childrens’ gender, age, and location.  Accordingly, Google 
collects the “biometric information” of children whose voices are recorded and whose faces are 
scanned while using its “G Suite for Education” platform in schools in Illinois and across the 
country.   See 740 ILCS 14/10. 
41. In direct violation of §§ 15(b)(2) and 15(b)(3) of the BIPA, Google never informed 
the parents of the children in Illinois (or elsewhere in the country) whose voiceprints and face 
templates it has collected of the specific purpose and length of term for which their children’s 
biometric identifiers and information would be collected, stored, and used, nor did Google obtain a 
written release from the parents of any of these children. 
42. In direct violation of § 15(a) of the BIPA, Google does not have written, publicly 
available policies identifying their retention schedules, or guidelines for permanently destroying 
the biometric identifiers and biometric information of these children. 
43. Moreover, the “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information” Google collected 
(and continues to collect) from children who used (and continue to use) its “G Suite for Education” 
platform, at schools in both Illinois and elsewhere throughout the country, also constitute 
“personally identifiable information” within the meaning of COPPA. And Google, by making 
commercially available and operating its online, cloud-based “G Suite for Education” service with 
actual knowledge that it collects, uses, and/or discloses personally identifiable information from 
children, constitutes an “operator” of such a service within the meaning of COPPA. 
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44. Google collected, stored, and used this “personally identifiable information”—
namely, the biometric identifiers and biometric information belonging to Plaintiffs and millions of 
other children under age 13 across the United States, as well as the names and other personal 
information capable of identifying the children to whom this sensitive biometric data belongs—
without first “[o]btaining verifiable consent” within the meaning of COPPA.  Indeed, by engaging 
in these practices as alleged herein, Google failed to “mak[e] any reasonable effort (taking into 
consideration available technology) to ensure that before personally identifiable information is 
collected from a child, a parent of the child. . . [r]eceives notice of the operator’s personally 
identifiable information collection, use, and disclosure practices; and [a]uthorizes any collection, 
use, and/or disclosure of the personally identifiable information.”  16 C.F.R. § 312.2. 
45. Thus, both BIPA and COPPA clearly prohibits what Google has done, Google has 
known so since at least 2015, and yet Google has made no effort to come into compliance with 
BIPA or COPPA at any point during that five-year period (be it by obtaining the requisite signed 
written release or verifiable consent from the from the parents or legal guardians of the children 
whose biometrics it collects in Illinois or by turning the technology off in Illinois’ schools 
altogether). 
V. Plaintiffs’ Experiences 
46. Google provides “ChromeBook” laptops to grade schools, elementary schools, and 
high schools nationwide, who in turn make these computing devices available for use by children 
who attend their schools.  These Google-manufactured and provided laptops come equipped with 
Google’s “G Suite for Education” platform, which requires the children using it to speak into a 
microphone on the laptop that records their voices and to look into a camera on the laptop that 
scans their faces. 
47. At all times during the time period relevant to this action, Plaintiffs have resided in 
Illinois and attended a primary school in Illinois, where they were provided access to Google-
supplied “ChromeBook” laptops, pre-installed with Google’s “G Suite for Education” platform by 
school officials.  Using accounts linked to their names and other personal details that Google had 
established for them on its ChromeBook laptops and “G Suite for Education” platform, Plaintiffs 
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frequently have logged into their accounts and used the “G Suite for Education” platform on these 
ChromeBook laptops while attending school, including features of the platform that required 
Plaintiffs to speak into the laptop’s audio recording device and look into the laptop’s camera, at 
which point Google recorded Plaintiffs’ voices and imaged their faces. 
48. After Google obtained recordings of Plaintiffs’ voices while they used the “G Suite 
for Education” platform on “ChromeBook” laptops, Google extracted, collected, stored, and 
cataloged each of their “voiceprints”—a unique, immutable, and highly sensitive biometric 
identifier used to identify them—in its vast database of personally identifying biometric data.  
Likewise, after Google scanned and imaged Plaintiffs’ faces while they used the “G Suite for 
Education” platform on “ChromeBook” laptops, Google extracted, collected, stored, and cataloged 
their “scans of face geometry” (i.e., “face templates”)—another unique, immutable, and highly 
sensitive biometric identifier used to identify them—in its vast database of personally identifying 
biometric data.  Accordingly, unbeknownst to Plaintiffs or their father, Clinton Farwell, Google 
collected Plaintiffs’ “biometric identifiers” as they used the company’s “G Suite for Education” 
platform at their school in Illinois.  See 740 ILCS 14/10. 
49. Google uses the voiceprints and face templates that it extracted from Plaintiffs’ 
voices and faces to, inter alia, identify them while using its ChromeBook laptops and “G Suite for 
Education” platform.  Specifically, each time either of the Plaintiffs’ faces is imaged or voices is 
recorded while they are using the “G Suite for Education” platform on a ChromeBook laptop at 
school, Google’s sophisticated voice or facial recognition technology creates a voiceprint of the 
Plaintiff’s voice or a or a face template of the Plaintiff’s face, and then compares the newly 
generated voiceprint or face template against the collection of voiceprints or face templates already 
stored in its database, whereupon Google is able to match the newly collected voiceprint or face 
template with the voiceprints or face templates previously collected from the Plaintiff that are 
stored in its database and linked to the Plaintiff’s identity.  If there is a match, Google is able to 
confirm the identity of the child using its platform, and also uses the information derived from the 
match to improve the quality and detail of the child’s voiceprint or face template saved in its 
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database and thus better train the functionality of the various features available on its platform—
enhancing the formidability of its brand in the process. 
50. The unique voiceprints and face templates Google extracted from Plaintiffs’ voices 
and faces were not only collected and used by Google to identify Plaintiffs by name, they have also 
been used by Google to recognize Plaintiffs’ gender, age, and location.  Accordingly, unbeknownst 
to Plaintiffs or their father, Clinton Farwell, Google collected Plaintiffs’ “biometric information” as 
they used the company’s “G Suite for Education” platform at their school in Illinois.  See 740 ILCS 
14/10. 
51. In direct violation of §§ 15(b)(2) and 15(b)(3) of BIPA, Google never informed the 
parents of the children in Illinois (or elsewhere in the country) whose voiceprints and face 
templates it collected of the specific purpose and length of term for which their children’s 
biometric identifiers and information would be collected, stored, and used, nor did Google obtain a 
written release from the parents of any of these children. 
52. In direct violation of § 15(a) of BIPA, Google does not have written, publicly 
available policies identifying their retention schedules, or guidelines for permanently destroying 
the biometric identifiers and biometric information of these school children. 
53. Neither Clinton Farwell (Plaintiffs’ father, legal guardian, and authorized 
representative) nor any other BIPA Class member’s parent, legal guardian, or authorized 
representative received a disclosure from Google that it would collect, capture, otherwise obtain, or 
store unique biometric identifiers or biometric information extracted from their child’s face or 
voice, and neither Clinton Farwell nor any other Class member’s parent, legal guardian, or 
authorized representative ever consented, agreed or gave permission—via a written release or 
otherwise—to authorize or permit Google to collect, capture, otherwise obtain, or store their child’s 
sensitive biometric data or in this way. 
54. Likewise, Google never provided Clinton Farwell (Plaintiffs’ father, legal guardian, 
and authorized representative) or any other parent, legal guardian, or authorized representative of 
any member of the Classes with an opportunity to prohibit or prevent the collection, storage, or use 
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of their child’s unique biometric identifiers, biometric information, or other personally identifying 
information. 
55. Nevertheless, when Plaintiffs and the unnamed members of the BIPA Class spoke to 
or had their faces imaged in connection with their use of Google’s “G Suite for Education” 
platform in  Illinois, Google’s sophisticated face and voice recognition technologies scanned the 
recordings of their voices and the geometry of their faces that it had collected, and created unique 
“voiceprints” and “face templates” corresponding to Plaintiffs and each member of the proposed 
Classes, all in direct violation of BIPA and COPPA. 
56. Additionally, in connection with Plaintiffs’ and COPPA Class members’ use of the 
“G Suite for Education” platform at schools in Illinois and across the country, Google has also 
collected and continues to collect, without first obtaining “verifiable parental consent,” browsing 
histories, contact lists, and audio notes and memos pertaining to Plaintiffs and the other COPPA 
Class members under the age of 13 across the United States, including in Illinois, as well as the 
Plaintiffs’ and COPPA Class members’ names and uniquely identifying school email addresses in 
direct violation of COPPA, 16 C.F.R. § 31 2.4. 
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 
57. Proposed Class Definition: Plaintiffs, by and through their father and legal 
guardian, bring this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on 
behalf of two classes of similarly situated individuals.  The first class Plaintiffs seek to represent is 
defined as follows (the “BIPA Class”): 
All persons who, while using the “G Suite for Education” platform at 
a primary or secondary school in Illinois, had their voiceprint or face 
template collected by Google after March 26, 2015. 
The second class Plaintiffs seek to represent is defined as follows (the “COPPA Class”): 
All persons under the age of 13 who, while using the “G Suite for 
Education” platform at a primary or secondary school in the United 
States, had their voiceprint, face template, or other personally 
identifiable information collected by Google after March 26, 2016. 
58. The BIPA Class and the COPPA Class are at times collectively referred to herein as 
the “Classes.” 
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59. Numerosity: The number of persons within each of the Classes is substantial, 
believed to amount to millions of children for the COPPA Class and tens of thousands of children 
for the BIPA Class.  It is, therefore, impractical to join all members of the Classes as named 
plaintiffs.  Further, the size and relatively modest value of the claims of the individual members of 
the BIPA Class, and the purely injunctive relief sought on behalf of the members of the COPPA 
Class, renders joinder impractical.  Accordingly, utilization of the class action mechanism is the 
most economically feasible means of determining and adjudicating the merits of this litigation. 
60. Commonality and Predominance: There are well-defined common questions of 
fact and law that exist as to all members of the Classes and that predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members of the Classes.  With respect to the BIPA Class, these common 
legal and factual questions, which do not vary from member to member, and which may be 
determined without reference to the individual circumstances of any individual member, include 
but are not limited to the following: 
a. whether Google collected, captured, or otherwise obtained Plaintiffs’ and 
other Illinois school children’s “biometric identifiers” or “biometric 
information” in connection with their use of the “G Suite for Education” 
platform at primary and secondary schools in Illinois during the preceding 
five years; 
b. whether Google stored Plaintiffs’ and the BIPA Class’s “biometric 
identifiers” or “biometric information”; 
c. whether Google informed Plaintiffs and the BIPA Class that it would collect, 
capture, otherwise obtain and then store their “biometric identifiers” or 
“biometric information”; 
d. whether Google obtained a written release (as defined in 740 ILCS 14/10) 
prior to collecting, capturing, or otherwise obtaining, and then storing, 
Plaintiffs’ and the BIPA Class’s “biometric identifiers” or “biometric 
information”; 
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e. whether Google developed a written policy, made available to the public, 
establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying 
“biometric identifiers” and “biometric information” when the initial purpose 
for collecting, capturing, or otherwise obtaining these “biometric identifiers” 
and “biometric information” has been satisfied or within 3 years of their last 
interaction with Plaintiffs and members of the BIPA Class, whichever occurs 
first; 
f. whether Google used Plaintiffs’ and the BIPA Class’s “biometric 
information” to identify them; 
g. whether Google’s violations of the BIPA were committed negligently; and 
h. whether Google’s violations of the BIPA were committed intentionally or 
recklessly. 
61. With respect to the COPPA Class, these common legal and factual questions, which 
do not vary from member to member, and which may be determined without reference to the 
individual circumstances of any individual member, include but are not limited to the following: 
a. whether Google collected, captured, or otherwise obtained “biometric 
identifiers” or “biometric information” from Plaintiffs and other children 
under the age of 13 in connection with their use of the “G Suite for 
Education” platform at primary and secondary schools in the United States 
during the preceding four years; 
b. whether “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information” constitute 
“personally identifiable information” within the meaning of COPPA; 
c. whether Google collected, captured, or otherwise obtained the “biometric 
identifiers,” “biometric information,” or other personally identifiable 
information from COPPA Class members in connection with their use of the 
“G Suite for Education” platform at primary and secondary schools; 
d. whether Google properly informed COPPA Class members’ parents or legal 
guardians and the BIPA Class that it would collect, capture, otherwise obtain 
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and then store their “biometric identifiers”, “biometric information”, or other 
collected personally identifiable information within the meaning of COPPA; 
and 
e. whether Google obtained “verifiable parental consent” before collecting, 
using, or disclosing “biometric identifiers”, “biometric information”, or 
other collected personal information from COPPA Class members. 
62. Adequate Representation: Plaintiffs have retained and are represented by qualified 
and competent counsel who are highly experienced in complex consumer class action litigation.  
Plaintiffs and their counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this class action.  Neither of 
the Plaintiffs, nor any of their counsel, have any interest adverse to, or in conflict with, the interests 
of the absent members of the Classes.  Plaintiffs are able to fairly and adequately represent and 
protect the interests of the Classes.  Plaintiffs have raised viable statutory claims of the type 
reasonably expected to be raised by members of the Classes, and will vigorously pursue those 
claims.  If necessary, Plaintiffs may seek leave of this Court to amend this Complaint to include 
additional representatives to represent the Classes or to add additional claims or classes as may be 
appropriate. 
63. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and 
efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual litigation of the claims of all members 
of the Classes is impracticable.  Even if every member of the Classes could afford to pursue 
individual litigation, the Court system could not.  It would be unduly burdensome to the courts in 
which individual litigation of numerous cases would proceed.  Individualized litigation would also 
present the potential for varying, inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and would magnify the 
delay and expense to all parties and to the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same 
factual issues.  By contrast, the maintenance of this action as a class action, with respect to some or 
all of the issues presented herein, presents few management difficulties, conserves the resources of 
the parties and of the court system and protects the rights of each member of the Classes.  Plaintiffs 
anticipate no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action.  Class-wide relief is 
essential to compel compliance with BIPA and COPPA. 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Violation of 740 ILCS 14/1, et seq. 
(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the BIPA Class) 
64. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
65. BIPA makes it unlawful for any private entity to, among other things, “collect, 
capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person’s or a customer’s biometric 
identifiers or biometric information, unless it first: (1) informs the subject . . . in writing that a 
biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or stored; (2) informs the subject . . 
. in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric 
information is being collected, stored, and used; and (3) receives a written release executed by the 
subject of the biometric identifier or biometric information or the subject’s legally authorized 
representative.”  740 ILCS 14/15(b). 
66. Plaintiffs’ father and legal guardian, Clinton Farwell, is Plaintiffs’ “legally 
authorized representative” within the meaning of BIPA, and served in such capacity at all times 
relevant to this action.  See 740 ILCS 14/15 (b). 
67. Google is a corporation and thus qualifies as a “private entity” under the BIPA.  See 
740 ILCS 14/10. 
68. Plaintiffs and the BIPA Class members are minor children who had their “biometric 
identifiers,” including their voiceprints and scans of face geometry, collected, captured, received, 
or otherwise obtained by Google in connection with their use of Google’s “G Suite for Education” 
platform at a primary school in Illinois after March 26, 2015.   See 740 ILCS 14/10. 
69. Plaintiffs and all members of the BIPA Class are minor children who had their 
“biometric information” collected by Google (in the form of their gender, age, and location) 
through Google’s collection and use of personally identifying information derived from their 
“biometric identifiers” that Google has used to identify them. 
70. Google systematically collected, captured, or otherwise obtained Plaintiffs’ and the 
BIPA Class members’ “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information” without first obtaining 
signed written releases, as required by 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(3), from any of them or their “legally 
authorized representatives,” i.e., their parents or legal guardians. 
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71. In fact, Google failed to properly inform Plaintiffs or members of the BIPA Class, 
or any of the foregoing’s parents, legal guardians, or other “legally authorized representatives,” in 
writing that Plaintiffs’ or the BIPA Class members’ “biometric identifiers” and “biometric 
information” were being “collected or stored” by Google, nor did Google inform Plaintiffs or 
members of the BIPA Class, or any of the foregoing’s parents, legal guardians, or other “legally 
authorized representatives,” in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which 
Plaintiffs’ or the BIPA Class members’ “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information” were 
being “collected, stored and used” as required by 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(1)-(2). 
72. In addition, Google does not publicly provide a retention schedule or guidelines for 
permanently destroying the “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information” of Plaintiffs or the 
BIPA Class members, as required by the BIPA.  See 740 ILCS 14/15(a). 
73. Google has denied BIPA’s promise of privacy to those who need it most.  By 
collecting, storing, and using Plaintiffs’ and the other BIPA Class members’ “biometric identifiers” 
and “biometric information” as described herein, Google recklessly or intentionally violated each 
of BIPA’s requirements, and infringed Plaintiffs’ and the other Class members’ rights to keep their 
sensitive, immutable, and uniquely identifying biometric data private.  
74. On behalf of themselves and the proposed BIPA Class members, by and through 
their father and natural legal guardian, Clinton Farwell, Plaintiffs seek: (1) injunctive and equitable 
relief as is necessary to protect the interests of Plaintiffs and the other members of the BIPA Class 
by requiring Google to comply with the BIPA’s requirements for the collection, capture, and 
storage of “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information” as described herein, including to 
permanently destroy the biometric data it has collected from minor children in Illinois to date and 
to refrain from collecting such data in the future absent the requisite prior informed written 
authorization of their legally authorized representatives; (2) statutory damages of $1,000.00 to 
Plaintiff H.K., Plaintiff J.C., and each Class member pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20 for each 
negligent violation of BIPA committed by Google; (3) statutory damages of $5,000.00 to Plaintiff 
H.K., Plaintiff J.C., and each Class member pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20 for each intentional or 
reckless violation of BIPA committed by Google; and (4) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and 
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other litigation expenses to Plaintiffs’ counsel and proposed Class counsel pursuant to 740 ILCS 
14/20(3). 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. 
(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the COPPA Class) 
75. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1-63 as if fully set forth herein. 
76. Google engaged in business acts and practices deemed “unlawful” under the UCL, 
because, as alleged above, Google unlawfully collected, stored, and used the biometric identifiers, 
biometric information, and other personally identifying information of Plaintiffs and the other 
COPPA Class members without first obtaining the requisite parental consent in violation of 
COPPA and Federal Trade Commission regulations. 
77. Under COPPA, an operator of a website or online service that collects personal 
information from children must provide notice to the child’s parent about its data collection 
practices and obtain verifiable parental consent prior to any collection or use of personal 
information from children. A violation of this regulation is deemed unlawful. 16 C.F.R. § 312.3. 
78. COPPA defines a “child” as “an individual under the age of 13.” 16 C.F.R. §312.2. 
79. Google is required to comply with the requirements set out in COPPA because it has 
specifically developed the Google Education platform for use by students in grades K-12 at schools 
across the United States, including in Illinois, and has actual knowledge that children under the age 
of 13 use its apps and services. 
80. Plaintiffs and the COPPA Class members are minor children under the age of 13 
who had their “biometric identifiers,” “biometric information,” and other personally identifying 
information including their names and e-mail addresses collected, captured, received, or otherwise 
obtained by Google in connection with their use of Google’s “G Suite for Education” platform at a 
school in the United States after March 26, 2016. 
81. Google’s “G Suite for Education” service utilized by Plaintiffs and members of the 
COPPA Class features “subject matter, visual content, use of animated characters or child-oriented 
activities and incentives, music or other audio content, age of models, presence of child celebrities 
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or celebrities who appeal to children, language or other characteristics of the Web site or online 
service, as well as . . . advertising promoting or appearing on the Web site or online service [that] is 
directed to children.”  See 16 C.F.R. § 312.2. 
82. Google is an “operator” as contemplated by 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 because it operates a 
“Web site located on the Internet or an online service and who collects or maintains personal 
information from or about the users of or visitors to such Web site or online service . . . where such 
Web site or online service is operated for commercial purposes involving commerce among the 
several States or with 1 or more foreign nations.” Indeed, students can access Google’s services 
online and Google provides its Google Education platform to schools in Illinois and throughout the 
country. 
83. Google “collects” personal information from children under the age of 13 across the 
United States, including in Illinois, because it requests, prompts, or encourages a child to submit 
personal information online and it passively collects highly sensitive biometric data (as alleged 
above) from children online as they use the “G Suite for Education” platform at school. 
84. Specifically, Google collects and has collected, on information and belief, browsing 
histories, contact lists, and audio notes and memos of Plaintiffs and the other COPPA Class 
members under the age of 13 across the United States, including in Illinois, in the form of audio 
files containing the child’s voice and digitized images of the child’s facial geometry, as well as 
biometric identifiers and biometric information derived therefrom. Google attributed, and continues 
to attribute, all data it collects from children to their Google accounts with the child’s name and 
uniquely identifying school email address. 
85. Pursuant to 16 C.F.R. § 31 2.4(a), “[i]t shall be the obligation of the operator to 
provide notice and obtain verifiable parental consent prior to collecting, using, or disclosing 
personal information from children. Such notice must be clearly and understandably written, 
complete, and must contain no unrelated, confusing, or contradictory materials.” 
86. Google has failed to provide notice to Plaintiffs’ father and legal guardian Clinton 
Farwell, and has failed to provide such notice to the parents and guardians of the other members of 
the COPPA Class of its data collection practices as required by 16 C.F.R. § 312.4. Specifically, 
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Google failed to give direct notice to parents stating the types of personal information it seeks to 
collect from the child.  Any notice that Google provides is not intended for the child’s parent and 
contains terms that no child under the age of 13 would comprehend or would have the capacity to 
accept. 
87. Further, Google failed to obtain—or even adequately attempt to obtain—parental 
consent authorizing it to collect and use minors’ personal and sensitive information from Plaintiffs’ 
father and guardian Clinton Farwell or from the parents or guardians of any of the other COPPA 
Class members. 
88. Each instance of Google’s nonconsensual and unauthorized collection and use of 
Plaintiffs’ and other members of the COPPA Class’s personal information in one or more ways 
described above constitutes a separate violation of COPPA and is thus a separate violation of the 
UCL’s “unlawful” prong. 
89. Moreover, pursuant to Section 1303(c) of COPPA, 15 U.S.C. § 6502(c), a violation 
of COPPA constitutes an “unfair” or “deceptive” act or practice in or affecting commerce, in 
violation of the FTC Act and thus the UCL. 
90. Google additionally engaged in business acts or practices deemed “unfair” under the 
UCL because, as alleged above, Google failed to disclose during the Class Period that it was 
collecting, storing, and using the biometric identifiers, biometric information, and other personally 
identifying information of Plaintiffs and the other COPPA Class members without obtaining the 
requisite parental consent in violation of COPPA and Federal Trade Commission regulations. 
91. Unfair acts under the UCL have been interpreted using three different tests:            
(1) whether the public policy which is a predicate to a consumer unfair competition action under 
the unfair prong of the UCL is tethered to specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory 
provisions; (2) whether the gravity of the harm to the consumer caused by the challenged business 
practice outweighs the utility of the defendant’s conduct; and (3) whether the consumer injury is 
substantial, not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition, and is an 
injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided. Defendants’ conduct is unfair 
under each of these tests.  As described above, Google’s conduct violates the policies underlying 
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privacy law, as well as COPPA itself.  The gravity of the harm resulting from Google’s secret 
collecting, storing, and using of biometric identifiers, biometric information, and other personally 
identifying information from children under the age of 13, without the requisite parental consent, is 
significant and there is no corresponding benefit to these children or their parents from such 
conduct.  Lastly, because Plaintiffs and COPA Class members were completely unaware of 
Google’s practices as alleged herein, they could not possibly have avoided the privacy-based harms 
such practices caused. 
92. Additionally, Google’s conduct constitutes deceptive business practices in violation 
of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200.  Under the UCL, a business practice that is likely to deceive an 
ordinary consumer constitutes a deceptive business practice.  Google’s conduct as alleged herein 
was deceptive because Google intentionally and deceptively misled children under the age of 13, 
the parents of those children, and the public about their practices of collecting, storing, and using of 
biometric identifiers, biometric information, and other personally identifying information from 
children under the age of 13.  Google has additionally made material misrepresentations and 
omissions, both directly and indirectly, to Plaintiffs and members of the COPPA Class, by and 
through their legal guardians, related to the invasive and unlawful practices alleged herein, 
including through its signing of the Student Privacy Pledge and through other public-facing 
documents such as websites, privacy policies, marketing materials, and public statements, in which 
it omits or otherwise conceals the full extent of its BIPA and COPPA violative conduct detailed 
herein and its practices of otherwise invading the privacy of children under the age of 13 in 
connection with their use of the “G Suite for Education” platform at school, as well as by 
misrepresenting, inter alia, the privacy-protective nature of its “G Suite for Education”  platform 
and its suitability for children. 
93. Finally, Google’s secret and unlawful practices of collecting, storing, and using the 
biometric identifiers, biometric information, and other personally identifying information of 
Plaintiffs and the other COPPA Class members without obtaining the requisite parental consent, in 
violation of COPPA and Federal Trade Commission regulations, take advantage of the lack of 
knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of the children, parents, and educators across the United 
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States to a grossly unfair degree.  Google purposefully misrepresents and obfuscates its COPPA-
violative conduct, which in tum results in the children of the United States being forced to use its 
“G Suite for Education” service in order to participate in school.  Google has complete control over 
the data collection, use, and retention practices of the “G Suite for Education” service, including 
the biometric data and other personally identifying information collected through the use of the 
service, and uses this control not only to secretly and unlawfully monitor and profile children, but 
to do so without the knowledge or consent of those children’s parents.  Such exploitation by 
Google, with its unique knowledge of its wrongful practices, occurs to the detriment of the children 
and their parents across the United States, and has invaded the privacy of Plaintiffs and the other 
members of the COPPA Class. 
94. Google’s violations of the UCL were, and are, willfully unlawful, deceptive, and 
unfair.  Google is aware of its violative conduct, yet has failed to adequately and affirmatively take 
steps to cure such misconduct. 
95. Plaintiffs and the other members of the COPPA Class were directly and proximately 
harmed by Google’s violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200. 
96. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the COPPA Class, by and through their 
father and legal guardian Clinton Farwell, seek: (1) an injunction requiring Google to obtain 
consent prior to collecting the “biometric identifiers,” “biometric information,” and other 
personally identifiable information within the meaning of COPPA from children under the age of 
13, to delete such “biometric identifiers,” “biometric information,” and other personally 
identifiable information already collected without parental consent, and to implement functionality 
sufficient to prevent the unlawful collection of such “biometric identifiers,” “biometric 
information,” and other personally identifiable information in the future; and (2) reasonable 
attorney’s fees (pursuant to Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1021.5). 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
 WHEREFORE, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs H.K. 
and J.C., minor children, by and through their respective father and legal guardian, Clinton Farwell, 
seek judgment against Defendant as follows: 
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(a) Certifying this case as a class action on behalf of the Classes defined above, 
appointing Plaintiffs, by and through their father and legally authorized guardian, 
Clinton Farwell, as representatives of the Classes, and appointing their counsel as 
Class Counsel on behalf of the Classes; 
(b) Declaring that Google’s actions, as set out above, violate the BIPA, 740 ILCS 14/1, 
et seq., with respect to Plaintiffs and members of the BIPA Class; 
(c) Declaring that Google’s actions, as set out above, violate the COPPA and thus the 
UCL, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq., with respect to Plaintiffs and 
members of the COPPA Class; 
(d) Awarding $1,000.00 statutory damages to Plaintiff H.K., Plaintiff J.C., and each 
member of the BIPA Class pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(1) for each violation of 
BIPA committed by Google negligently, or $5,000.00 pursuant to 740 ILCS 
14/20(2) for each violation of BIPA committed by Google intentionally or 
recklessly; 
(e) Awarding injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant to BIPA as is necessary to 
protect the interests of Plaintiffs and members of the BIPA Class, including, inter 
alia, an order requiring Google to collect, store, and use the biometric identifiers 
and biometric information of children in Illinois in compliance with BIPA, and to 
permanently destroy the biometric identifiers and biometric information it has 
collected from Plaintiffs and BIPA Class members to date; 
(f) Awarding injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant to the California UCL as is 
necessary to protect the interests of Plaintiffs and members of the COPPA Class, 
including, inter alia, an order requiring Google to collect, store, and use the 
biometric identifiers, biometric information, and other personally identifying 
information (within the meaning of COPPA) of children under the ages of 13 across 
the United States in compliance with COPPA, and to permanently destroy the 
biometric identifiers, biometric information, and other personally identifying 
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information covered by COPPA that it has collected from Plaintiffs and COPPA 
Class members to date; 
(g) Awarding Plaintiffs’ counsel and proposed Class counsel their reasonable litigation 
expenses and attorneys’ fees pursuant to BIPA and the UCL; 
(h) Awarding Plaintiffs and the Classes pre- and post-judgment interest, to the extent 
allowable; 
(i) Awarding Plaintiffs and the Classes such other and further relief as equity and 
justice may require. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
WHEREFORE, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs H.K. 
and J.C., minor children, by and through their respective father and legal guardian, Clinton Farwell, 




Dated:  April 2, 2020    BURSOR & FISHER, P.A. 
 
By:    /s/ L. Timothy Fisher   
                           L. Timothy Fisher 
 
L. Timothy Fisher (State Bar No. 191626) 
1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940 
Walnut Creek, CA  94596 
Telephone: (925) 300-4455 
Facsimile: (925) 407-2700 
Email: ltfisher@bursor.com 
 
BURSOR & FISHER, P.A. 
Scott A. Bursor (State Bar No. 276006) 
2665 S. Bayshore Dr., Suite 220 
Miami, FL 33133-5402 
Telephone: (305) 330-5512  
Facsimile: (305) 676-9006   
E-Mail: scott@bursor.com 
 
HEDIN HALL LLP 
David W. Hall (State Bar No. 274921) 
Four Embarcadero Center, Suite 1400 
San Francisco, CA  94111 
Telephone:  (415) 766-3534 
Facsimile:   (415) 402-0058 
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Counsel for Plaintiffs, by and through their 
father and legal guardian Clinton Farwell, 
and the Putative Class 
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